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Introduction
Efficiency assessments of regulated industries have become widespread in applied work and highlight the central role of productive efficiency in the context of regulation. Hence, one can observe that different variants of price cap regulation (PCR) in different regulated sectors in several countries have become prevalent. In fact, there appears to be is a consensus in terms of superior incentives for productive efficiency of PCR relative to traditional rate of return regulation (ROR) regimes [see Liston (1991) ].
The electricity distribution sector in Brazil, with its relatively new regulatory settings, has attracted attention in terms of productive efficiency assessments as indicated by Resende (2002) , Ramos-Real et al. (2009) , Tannuri-Pianto et al. (2009) and Souza et al. (2011) . Those studies, either based on stochastic or deterministic efficiency frontiers, highlight the heterogeneity of the sector and the prevalence of non-negligible underperformance in the case of some distribution firms.
However, a possible shortcoming of PCR relates to collateral effects pertaining to service quality degradation. De Fraja and Iozzi (2008) theoretically advance the possibility of adjusting the PCR rule for quality, and Currier (2007a, b) discusses some possible adjustment procedures that could be considered in actual regulatory practice. It is worth mentioning that the incorporation of a quality adjustment term (say the Q factor) has given rise to a new debate in different regulatory agencies [see Milne (2003) ]. In the case of electricity distribution in Brazil, the regulatory agency recently established rules for the aforementioned adjustments that extended the scope of the tariff rule beyond the usual productivity offset (the so-called X factor). Nevertheless, the debate on how to measure quality and then devise adjustment factors in the PCR rule is by no means settled. Resende and Cardoso (2016) undertook a large-scale study that explored the multivariate patterns of different service-quality in indicators in electricity distribution in Brazil and suggested salient quality heterogeneities that, in principle, do not have a clear cut regional pattern and yet indicate quality deterioration between 2010 and 2014.
However, it is important to further explore the multivariate nature of quality that had been previously acknowledged by Lynch et al. (1994) . In fact, a branch of the empirical literature that includes Façanha and Resende (2004) , Resende and Façanha (2005) and Resende and Tupper (2009) advanced efficiency frontiers for quality by means of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models for the telecommunications sectors. The adaptation involves interpreting unfavorable quality indicators as inputs and favorable quality indicators as outputs. In the present application for electricity distribution in Brazil, we extend that previous literature by focusing on a dynamic approach in terms of Malmquist indexes that allow the useful decomposition of productivity growth into catchup and frontier shifts. Such an efficiency frontier approach can potentially contribute beyond the more descriptive characterization as the benchmark perspective can eventually provide some relevant guidance for setting the quality adjustment factor under PCR.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section provides basic background on Brazilian electricity distribution and discusses the data sources and variables used in the empirical analysis. The third section makes a brief digression on the Malmquist approach for assessing productivity growth. The fourth presents the empirical results.
The fifth section provides some final comments.
Electricity distribution in Brazil

2.1-Basic background
The regulatory institutional framework for electricity distribution in Brazil is relatively new. Following the privatization process in 1995, the regulatory agency Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (ANEEL) was created in December 1996, and concerns with efficiency-inducing regulatory regimes gradually became more widespread as PCR was consolidated and the X factors were completely defined by 2003-4. Details on the institutional reforms in the sector are outlined in Mendonça and Dahl (1999), Losekann (2008) and Souza and Legey (2010) .
The concern with possible quality degradation under PCR is more recent in the context of the regulatory agency. In fact, it is only in the technical note by ANEEL (2015) that one defines a quality adjustment factor (the Q factor) to be included in the PCR rule together with the usual productivity offset (the X factor). It is noticeable that efficiency measurement methods, for example DEA have attained increasing acceptance at ANEEL; however, the criteria for setting the X and Q factors are non-trivial, and debates on possible improvements are still warranted. In the latter case, in particular, the ranges are defined in accordance with particular values of a consumer satisfaction index.
Beyond the choice of adequate quality indicators, it is possible to conceive that DEAbased efficiency frontiers for quality could in principle provide some additional guidance towards the definition of reference firms and therefore further illuminate the setting of the Q factor. . perceived value (PVAL): reflects benefit relation; considers 3 questions pertaining to the benefits of energy provision, service quality and quality of customer service;
. satisfaction (SAT): considers 3 questions related to global satisfaction, distance to the ideal firm and global nonconformity;
. confidence in the provider (CONF): considers 4 variables to assess the extent to which the firm is trustworthy;
. fidelity ( The relevant summary statistics for the aforementioned indicators are presented in Table 1 . The list of the 42 firms included in the sample is included in the appendix.
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 2 The indicators described in this sub-section were considered in Resende and Cardoso (2016) , where a canonical correlation analysis was undertaken. The present data description relies on that work. 3 Iacobucci et al. (1995) contend that there are conceptual differences between service quality and consumer satisfaction. 4 The IASC survey was not conducted in 2011 and we intended to consider a reasonable time interval
Malmquist indexes: a brief digression
3.1-Introduction
The input-based Farrell efficiency, or the input efficiency of a production plan (x; y) relative to a technology T, is defined as E= min { E > 0|(Ex, y) ϵ T}, i.e., it is the maximal proportional contraction of all inputs x that allows us to produce output y. Thus, if E = 0.5, it
indicates that we could have saved 50% off all inputs and still produced the same outputs.
Similarly, output-based Farrell efficiency or output efficiency is defined as F = max {E>0|(x, Fy) ϵ T} and is defined as the maximal proportional expansion of all outputs y that is feasible with the given inputs x. For instance, if F = 1.5 one could expand the output vector by 50% without employing more inputs. In the Farrell approach to the efficiency measurement, all inputs are reduced or alternatively all outputs are expanded by the same factor. This proportional adjustment has been challenged by a series of alternative efficiency measurement approaches. We consider simultaneous improvements on the input and output side by basically combining the Farrell input and output efficiency measures into one measure, sometimes referred to as the graph hyperbolic measure of technical efficiency as H=min{H>0|(Hx, ) ϵ T} [Bogetoft and Otto (2011) ].
The H measure tries to simultaneously reduce the inputs and to expand the outputs as in the Farrell approach. The input side is exactly as in the E measure, and the output side is in equal to the F measure. In fact, when we reduce H, the reciprocal 1/H is expanded, which is similar to the F factor in the Farrell output efficiency measures. Also note that for (x, y) ϵ T, we have H≤1. The interpretation of a hyperbolic efficiency H is that we can reduce input to Hx and simultaneously expand output to y.
3.2-The Malmquist Index
The most popular approach to dynamic efficiency evaluations is the Malmquist index [see Färe et al. (2008) 
If the firm has improved from period s to t we will obtain E(t; s) > E(s; s), and therefore, 
Because there is no reason to prefer one to the other, the Malmquist index is simply the geometric mean of the two:
If the firm has improved its performance from period s to period t, then we will observe M(s, t) > 1. If, on the contrary, the firm is less efficient in period t than in period s we will have M(s, t) < 1.
We can decompose the Malmquist Index into two components [see Färe et al. (1994) ]: 
.
The first component in the decomposition is the efficiency change index EC, which measures the catch-up relative to the current technology. We always measure this factor against the present technology, asking if the firm has moved closer to the frontier.
If the answer is positive, E(t, t) > E(s, s) and EC > 1, otherwise we will have E(t, t) < E(s, s) and EC < 1.
The technical change index TC is the geometric mean of two ratios. In both ratios, we fix the firm's production plan at time t and use this as the benchmark against which we measure changes in the technology. If the technology has progressed, we will have E(t, s) > E(t, t) and the first ratio in the geometric mean will be greater than unity. The idea of the second ratio is the same, but here we only use the time s version of our firm as the benchmark when we investigate technological improvements. In short, the TC measures technological change, and TC > 1 represents technological progress in the sense that more outputs can be produced using fewer inputs. Similar to the path followed by the DEA literature, the Malmquist-DEA approach has converged towards the consideration of bootstrap resampling methods to ascertain the robustness of the indicators and avoid a purely deterministic formulation. In fact, Simar Data Envelopment Analysis addresses neither the randomness nor the measurement error. All deviations from the DMU frontier are assigned as inefficiencies.
However, we know that this may not be true as the data may contain measurement errors. In addition, production and consumption activities are subject to various types of shocks and randomness caused by various phenomena beyond the control of DMUs (e.g., weather, quality of certain inputs, strikes, and market-related problems). An important point is that DEA estimators are naturally positively biased because the relative efficiency frontier is estimated based on one sample. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the benchmarks (efficient DMUs) have made their best effort. In that case, the estimated frontier is below the "real" frontier, which is not observed. In the best scenario, the estimated frontier coincides with the "real" frontier. Thus, each DMU is closer to the estimated frontier than the "real" frontier, and DEA estimators are benevolent or biased upward (in favor of DMUs) and overestimated. Because the actual frontier is not observed, the additional problem arises that the actual probability distribution of DEA estimators is not known. , ℎ subject to
for #, $ %{ , , , , , , , } 2. Compute a pseudo data set {(x * is , y * is ); (x * it , y * it ) i = 1,...,L} to form the reference bootstrap technology using bivariate kernel density estimation and the adaptation of the reflection method proposed by Simar and Wilson (1999) . With the information provided above, it is possible to ascertain whether productivity growth (or decline) measured by the Malmquist productivity index is significant, i.e., it is greater than (or less than) unity at the desired significance levels. The same holds for the sources of productivity, as it is now possible to assess the significance of both efficiency change and technical change, if they occur. The interpretation is straightforward. In the 95% confidence interval case, if it contains unity, then the corresponding measure is not significantly different from one at the 5% significance level, i.e., it is not possible to conclude that changes occurred in efficiency, technology, or productivity. In contrast, when the interval excludes unity, one can conclude with 95%
confidence that the corresponding measure is significantly different from unity.
Consequently, as stated by Simar and Wilson (1999) , one should be careful when making performance comparisons based on original efficiency scores. While some DMUs might appear to differ when considering only their original and bias-corrected scores, their confidence intervals may overlap. Therefore, in such cases there is no empirical evidence to reject the hypothesis that two such units are equally efficient.
Empirical results
The results for the bias-corrected Malmquist indexes and corresponding confidence intervals are presented in table 2. The empirical analysis was implemented with the software library FEAR 2.0 in R language developed by Paul W. Wilson and initially described in Wilson (2008) .
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE Table 2 above shows that in 17 out of 42 firms, the 95% confidence interval contains unity.
Consequently, the Malmquist Index is not significantly different from one at the 5% significance level, and it is not possible to conclude that changes occurred in productivity.
As a consequence, there is not enough empirical evidence to reject the hypothesis that such firms have changed their productivity. Generally, we also cannot say that the mean and median productivity have changed. By inspecting the confidence intervals we can observe that the productivity has decreased in 16 firms and increased in 9 firms.
The results also show that there are substantial dissimilarities between firms' confidence intervals. Some of estimated confidence intervals are quite wide (e.g., CAIUA, CFLO, CPFLMococa) while others are rather narrow (e.g., ELETROPAULO, ESCELSA).
Moreover, Table 2 additionally shows that LIGHT is only an apparent benchmark in the sample because its confidence interval lower bound is below the upper bounds of CAIUA, CEA, and CHESP. Therefore, LIGHTS's 95% confidence interval overlaps with those firms' intervals and we cannot ascertain that LIGHT is a true benchmark. The firm that seemingly performs poorly is CEMAR, but its confidence interval overlaps with EBO's interval and we cannot afford to assign it alone as the worst performer in the sample.
If we consider a regional perspective, it is possible to identify quality improvements, mostly in firms operating in the Southeast region and to a smaller extent in the South region, which is one of the most developed regions in Brazil. In the other extreme, quality deterioration appears to be somewhat more prevalent in the Northeast region, although such cases also occur in the Southeast region. In the majority of the cases (17 out of 42), the evidence suggests unchanged quality over the investigated period. Thus, despite the relatively short time interval of the analysis, the evidence seems to suggest that the energy distribution sector is somewhat uneven across the country. Moreover, the Malmquist DEAbased approach allows us to consider multiple dimensions of quality from a dynamic comparative perspective and reinforces the initial descriptive mapping of the sector advanced by Resende and Cardoso (2016) , who had highlighted the significant heterogeneity and non-negligible quality under performance.
The next logical step comprises the usual split of the overall Malmquist index into the catch-up effect (EC) and frontier shift effect (TC). This exploratory assessment is made possible by considering the results displayed in Table 3 .
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE
It is not surprising that, given the short time interval under consideration, nearly all components associated with frontier shift are close to unity and the change in quality is largely associated with the catch-up component. The magnitudes of such components, which capture changes relative to a given frontier, are especially salient in the extreme cases either for bad or for good as exemplified by CEMAR and LIGHT, respectively. These results, of course, do not necessarily challenge the (static) high quality perceived by the regulatory agency ANEEL, which has praised SULGIPE and RGE in recent years.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that when one considers a more comprehensive multidimensional analysis, a firm that was associated with multiple explosions of utilities holes (LIGHT) showed a large relative improvement between 2010 and 2014.
Final comments
The paper aimed to provide a dynamic analysis on the evolution of service quality in electricity distribution in Brazil between 2010 and 2014. A key aspect to be considered addresses the multidimensional character of service quality. In fact, the usual focus of regulators on specific indicators can be potentially misleading, and despite the recent introduction of a quality adjustment factor in the price cap rule (the Q factor) in terms of selected indicators, the issue of how to measure quality is by no means settled. The recently introduced rules that establish awards or penalties based on the aggregate consumer satisfaction index IASC in terms of specific discretionary quality thresholds could potentially be improved. In fact, the adoption of a multidimensional perspective that considers both direct technical and disaggregated consumer satisfaction indicators might delineate a distinct evaluation of service-quality in electricity distribution that would prevail with the current practice of relying on a smaller set of indicators.
The use of efficiency frontier methods and a benchmarking perspective is already considered in the context of Brazilian regulatory agency ANEEL to indirectly guide the choice of the productivity offset (the X factor). The present paper suggests that a similar efficiency frontier for service quality may provide some, at least indirect, guidance for setting the quality adjustment factor (the Q factor). The topic warrants additional research, and possible avenues for future research include a) Improving efficiency frontiers for quality, both by improving the data quality with a longer sample as it becomes available and considering other models and decomposition schemes;
b) Integrating quality into efficiency frontiers for usual inputs and outputs in electricity distribution, for example as overviewed by Yang and Pollitt (2009) , who addressed the incorporation of undesirable outputs and uncontrollable variables in DEA models; c) Considering exogenous determinants of productivity that might affect firms' performance in the spirit of Simar and Wilson (2007) , who regressed estimates of efficiency on some covariates in a second stage. 
